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Constitutional Law: First Amendment Guarantees
Lawyers Limited Right to Advertise Fees:
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
The Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Bates v. State Bar ofA rizona'
involved the right of two young attorneys with impressive academic
credentials 2 to advertise their legal services in a local newspaper. 3 The
attorneys had sought to create what they termed a "legal clinic" which
was, in fact, a low-budgeted law office handling exclusively low-cost,
non-litigable legal matters such as uncontested divorces, changes of
name, and adoptions.4 Their objective was to provide such services to
moderate-income clients for a comparatively low fee.' By cultivating
and reaching a high volume of clientele through advertising, the attor-
1. 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
2. Attorney John R. Bates was named the outstanding student of his class by his
law school faculty, and attorney Van O'Steen graduated cum laude. Both are graduates
of the Arizona State University College of Law class of 1972. Id. at 2693 n.2.
3. Id. at 2694. The attorneys claimed in their advertisement that they provided
"legal services at very reasonable fees," and went on to list their services as including:
-Divorce or legal separation-uncontested
(both spouses sign papers)
$175.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee
-Preparation of all court papers and instructions
on how to do your own simple uncontested divorce
$100.00
-Adoption-uncontested severance proceeding
$225.00 plus approximately $10.00 publication cost
-Bankruptcy-non-business, no contested proceedings
Individual-$250.00 plus $55.00 court filing fee
Wife and Husband-300.00 plus $110.00 court filing fee
-Change of name
$95.00 plus $20.00 court filing fee.
Id. at 2710 app.
4. Id. at 2694.
5. Id.
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neys could service their clients with a minimum amount of expense due
to the lack of research and preparation required to fulfill their needs.'
The lawyers' advertisement appeared in the Arizona Republic
newspaper on February 22, 1976, and included the quotation of fees for
specified services.7 As a result, an action was brought against them by
the President of the Arizona State Bar8 for violating the A.B.A. Code
of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) as incorpo-
rated by Rule 29(a) of the Supreme Court of Arizona.9 It was the
decision of the Special Local Committee, which originally heard the
matter; 0 of the Board of Governors of the State Bar, which reviewed
the bar committee's action;" and of the Arizona Supreme Court,'12 that
the attorneys were in violation of that rule. 3 The attorneys petitioned
for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court," which
reversed the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court 5 and HELD that
the first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech precluded the State
Bar from banning the appellants' limited type of legal advertising. 6
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 2695.
9. 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78). The pertinent part of the
rule provides that:
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or any other
lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer through newspaper or magazine
advertisements, radio or television announcements, display advertisements in the
city or telephone directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall
he authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.
10. At this hearing, pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court Rule 36, 17A ARIz.
REV. STAT. (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), a three-member committee recommended that
the attorneys be suspended from the practice of law for not less than six months. 97 S.
Ct. at 2695.
II. The Board of Governors, upon review pursuant to Arizona Supreme Court
Rule 36, 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), reduced the committee-
imposed sanction to a one-week suspension. 97 S. Ct. at 2695.
12. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976), rev'd sub nom. Bates v.
State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977), where the court, pursuant to its rule 37,
17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. (West 1973), reviewed the Board of Governors' action. 97 S. Ct.
at 2695. The court reduced the sanction to a censure "[blecause the court. . . felt that
[the lawyers'] advertising 'was one in good faith to test the constitutionality of DR
2-101(B) .... 1 .Id. at 2696.
13. Id. at 2695.
14. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Bates v. State Bar of
Arizona, 429 U.S. 813 (1976).
15. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 97 S. Ct. 2691 (1977).
16. Id. at 2709.
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Appellants' argument was based upon two contentions: (1) that the
state court ruling violated the Sherman Act 17 and (2) that the ruling
infringed upon rights protected by the first amendment. 8 The Court
first considered, but rejected, the appellants' arguments-based on the
Sherman Act-that they had a right to compete in the market place
without undue governmental interference. 9 In suimmarily dismissing
this argument,"0 the Court upheld the lower court's ruling that "[tihe
regulation of the State Bar . . . is an activity of the [state] acting as
sovereign, ' 21 and is therefore exempt from the Sherman Act.2 2 In sup-
port of its ruling the Court cited the case of Parker v. Brown,3 which
held that the State of California could regulate competition among the
state's raisin growers, as this regulation by the State, as sovereign, was
a restraint "which the Sherman Act did not undertake to prohibit.
' 24
In aligning itself with the Parker holding, the Court distinguished the
case before it from previous cases in which provisions of the Sherman
Act were determined to have been violated by the state.2 Those cases
17. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, §§ 1 & 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (1976).
18. 97 S. Ct. at 2695, 2698.
19. Sections 1 & 2 of the Sherman Act provide:
§ I Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any con-
tract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
§ 2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part
of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
Sherman Antitrust Act, supra note 17.
20. 97 S. Ct. at 2696-98. The Court was in fact unanimous in its ruling on this
aspect of the case, as all the dissenting opinions were directed at other issues. Id. at 2710
(Burger, C.J.); 2711-12 (Powell, Stewart, JJ.); 2719 (Rehnquist, J.).
21. Matter of Bates, 113 Ariz. 394, ___. 555 P.2d 640, 643 (1976).
22. 97 S. Ct. at 2698.
23. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
24. Id. at 352.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2696.
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involved either outright "price fixing" by the state26 or instances where
the state had no "independent regulatory interest" in the matters af-
fected by state regulation; i.e., the measures taken had not been based
upon correcting "flaws in the competitive market," nor did they arise
out of concerns about public health or safety. 7
Turning to the only other argument of the appellants, the Court,
through the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun, ruled that the
attorneys' rights of free speech under the first amendment were pre-
eminent over the constraints imposed on them by the State Bar's Disci-
plinary Rule. 2 In so ruling, the Court analogized the present case to that
of another, Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council,29
involving the right of a pharmacist to advertise the price of prescription
drugs. 3 The Court recalled that in Virginia Pharmacy it had ruled that
the first amendment guaranteed the pharmacist the right to advertise his
wares, even though the advertisement had not reported "any particu-
larly newsworthy fact" or commented upon "any cultural, philosophical
or political subject."' 31 Such speech was deemed to be commercial in
that its sole purpose was to attract business.32 The Court then cited a
list of its prior analogous decisions holding this type of speech to be
protected. 33 It continued that "such speech should not be withdrawn
26. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), involved a minimum fee
schedule for attorneys that was enforced by the State Bar.
27. 97 S. Ct. at 2697. The case involved is Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S.
579 (1976), in which defendant, a private electric utility regulated by a state agency,
distributed light bulbs to its customers as part of its service. The Court held that the
mere fact that a state regulatory agency approved of such practice did not provide "a
sufficient basis for implying an exemption from the federal antitrust laws for that
program." Id. at 592-93, 598.
28. 97 S. Ct. at 2698-709 (full discussion of first amendment claims).
29. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
30. 97 S. Ct. at 2698. The pharmacist had been accused of "unprofessional con-
duct" in violation of a Virginia statute. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (Court struck down, on the basis of
the first amendment, the portion of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as
amended in 1974, which imposed a ceiling on expenditures by political candidates); New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (Court held, inter alia, that an expression
did not lose constitutional protection, under the first amendment, because it appeared
in the form of a paid advertisement); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (Court
struck down a city ordinance which made a bookstore owner absolutely criminally liable
for possessing material which was judicially determined to be obscene; the statute was
held to violate the freedom of the press as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment);
4
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from protection merely because it proposed a mundane commercial
transaction." 34
Aside from the right of the speaker to advertise for purely commer-
cial purposes, the Court also found a concurrent first amendment right
on the part of the public to be informed. 5 Just as with the pharmaceuti-
cal regulation statute contained in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court found
that the Arizona disciplinary rule "serves to inhibit the free flow of
commercial information and to keep the public in ignorance."3 By
upholding the right of the public to know, in addition to that of the
lawyer to inform, the Court effectively disarmed the Bar's argument
that the ban on lawyer advertising protected both the interests of the
public and the image of the legal profession. The Bar contended that
the public would lose respect for the legal profession, because if advertis-
ing were permitted the profession would appear over-commercialized."
The Court responded that the appellants were accomplishing the desire
of the American Bar Association that attorneys should discuss fee ar-
rangements with clients as a first order of business.38 The Court added
that since neither bankers nor engineers have suffered any discernible
loss of dignity as a result of price advertising,39 there seemed to be no
valid reason why the legal profession should suffer. Moreover, the Court
held that to "condemn the candid revelation of the same information"
by an attorney to a prospective client before he enters his office that he
would be ethically bound to give him afterwards is equally invalid. 0
Indeed, the Court expressed the view that the lack of information on
the part of the public as to legal fees may actually deter people from
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (ordinance was struck down which
required Jehovah's Witnesses to procure a city license before they could solicit people
to purchase religious books and pamphlets); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296
(1940) (statute struck down which required a prior determination by the secretary of
the public welfare council that people seeking to solicit support for their cause were truly
representing a religious cause).
34. 97 S. Ct. at 2699.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2700.
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2701.
38. Id. The Court stated: "[T]he American Bar Association advises that an attor-
ney should reach 'a clear agreement with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to
be made,' and that this is to be done '[als soon as feasible after a lawyer has been
employed.' Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 2-19 (1976)."
39. 97 S. Ct. at 2701-2.
40. Id. at 2701.
5
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seeking legal assistance out of fear that an exhorbitant fee will be ex-
tracted from them.4'
As to the Bar's contention that the advertising of a fee is misleading
because fees are determined by the particular facts of each client's case,
the Court held that those services advertised by the appellants were all
routine matters and, therefore, subject to a set fee schedule which could
be honestly advertised prior to individual consultation with a client."
The Bar also argued that advertising would not advance the role of the
attorney as a diagnostician;" that it would leave potential customers
with a less than complete picture from which to choose a lawyer;44 and
that it would stir up fraudulent claims.45 The Court, however, thought
that the benefits of advertising outweighed whatever merit these argu-
ments contained. It concluded that permitting a limited type of advertis-
ing, such as that put out by Bates and O'Steen, would serve to "facilitate
the process of intelligent selection of lawyers, and to assist in making
legal services fully available."46 Ironically, the Court took these very
words directly from the American Bar Association's Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility.47
The Court also rejected the argument of the Bar that overhead
expenses will necessarily rise to cover the added costs of advertising,
resulting in higher legal fees for the consumer.48 Instead, the Court
opted for the counter-argument that a healthy competition for clients,
increased by advertising fees, will probably lower legal fees and provide
the public with the opportunity to compare advertised prices.49
Regarding a possible second consequence of the added costs of
advertising, the Court also disagreed with the argument that new attor-
neys would have an economically difficult time penetrating the estab-
41. Id. at 2702. The Court then referred to a footnote in a report which found
that middle-class consumers have overestimated lawyers' fees for drawing up a simple
will by 91%, for reading and advising on a two-page installment sales contract by 340%,
and for a thirty-minute consultation by 123%. Id. at n.22.
42. Id. at 2703. The Court noted that the Arizona Bar itself sponsored a Legal
Services Program in which participating attorneys performed services like those adver-
tised by Bates and O'Steen at standardized rates. Id.
43. Id. at 2704.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2704-5.
46. Id. at 2705.
47. EC 2-1 (1976).
48. 97 S. Ct. at 2705-6.
49. Id. at 2706.
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lished market. The Court said, in fact, that advertising would probably
serve to aid young lawyers who are seeking to make themselves known
in the market place."0
Finally, the Court considered and rejected arguments that the qual-
ity of legal services would decline51 and that enforcement difficulties
would increase if any relaxation of the present advertising ban were
allowed. 2 The Court stated that "[r]estraints on advertising. . . are an
ineffective way of deterring shoddy work." 53 The Court refuted the
Bar's argument that "an attorney who advertises a standard fee will cut
quality" by pointing out that the Bar itself had set standard fee sched-
ules in its own Legal Services Program.54 As to the enforcement prob-
lems, the Court indicated that it was confident most lawyers would
continue to conduct themselves honorably. 5 For those who did not, the
Court felt that the desire of the members of the legal profession, as a
whole, to preserve their good name would cause them to join together
in "weeding out those few who abuse their trust."58
Understandably, the Court sought to base its decision on the nar-
rowest possible ground and to preserve partially the State Bar's goal of
preventing the defrauding of the public and the concomitant degrada-
tion of the legal profession. It was, therefore, carefully pointed out in
the opinion that misstatements of fact, or deceptively-worded advertise-
50. Id. The Court compared the plight of a new attorney who would have to pay
some additional advertisement costs to that of an attorney who would have to rely on
the more traditional methods, such as contacts and social connections. It found that a
ban on advertising would serve "to perpetuate the market position of established attor-
neys. Consideration of [market place] entry-barrier problems would urge that advertis-
ing be allowed so as to aid the new competitor in penetrating the market." Id. The Court
did not consider, on the other hand, the potentially negative impact of advertising upon
those new attorneys who each year seek clerkships with established firms. Such posi-
tions, as a result of increased costs due to advertising, could become a luxury that law
firms can no longer so easily afford.
51. Id. The Bar argued that advertising would cause the offering of a legal
"package" at a set price, and that lawyers would "be inclined to provide, by indiscrimi-
nate use, the standard package regardless of whether it fits the client's needs." Id.
52. Id. The Bar claimed that a public which "lacks sophistication in legal matters
• . . may be particularly susceptible to misleading or deceptive advertising by lawyers."
It feared that no regulatory agency would be able to shoulder the burden of monitoring
the advertised services and comparing them to those actually rendered. Id. at 2706-7.
53. Id. at 2706.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2707.
56. Id.
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ments, could in no way be sanctioned by the Court's ruling. 7 As the
Court concluded:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the State may prevent
the publication in a newspaper of appellants' truthful advertisement con-
cerning the availability and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply
that the flow of such information may not be restrained, and we therefore
hold the present application of the disciplinary rule against appellants to
be violative of the First Amendment.58
In separate dissenting opinions, both Mr. Chief Justice Burger and
Mr. Justice Powell5" agreed that the price of certain routine legal mat-
ters may safely be advertised without foreseeable detriment. Neverthe-
less, they found that the majority had failed to define adequately what
type of legal services could be considered routine. Specifically, the Chief
Justice took the majority to task for failing to acknowledge that an
uncontested divorce, which was one of the advertised items involved in
this case, could easily cost a great deal more than the $195 ($175 fee plus
$20 court cost) claimed by the attorneys-appellants in their newspaper
advertisement. 0 As the Chief Justice explained, the cost of a divorce
could vary drastically depending upon whether alimony, child support,
or a property settlement were involved.61 For this reason, Mr. Chief
Justice Burger found that the task of enforcing the ruling of the Court
permitting certain unspecified types of legal advertising is an impossible
one to perform." As a corrective measure, the Chief Justice would have
required qualifying statements in legal advertisements to the effect that
fees for such non-litigable matters could vary over a broad range, de-
pending upon individual circumstances, so as to "insure that the expec-
tations of clients are not unduly inflated."63
The dissent of Mr. Justice Powell echoed the Chief Justice's con-
cern that the parameters of legitimate legal advertising, based on rou-
tineness, were ambiguous and arbitrary. Mr. Justice Powell felt that if
lawyers were to be allowed to advertise their services and prices, "the
57. Id. at 2709.
58. Id.
59. The latter was joined in his opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart.
60. 97 S. Ct. at 2710.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2711.
63. Id.
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public interest [would] require the most particularized regulation."" He
hinted at the danger that attorneys would view the decision as conferring
a license to wage a potentially deceiving campaign for clients. He envi-
sioned that the majority's opinion would result in lawyers using such
adjectives as "fair," "moderate," "low-cost," or "lowest in town." He
also feared that the Court's failure to pronounce more definitive guide-
lines would unduly inhibit states from carrying out their proper function
of regulating legal advertising.65
Nor did Mr. Justice Powell agree with the Court's primary assump-
tion that the Arizona disciplinary rule and rules similar to it from other
states are inconsistent with first amendment guarantees. He distin-
guished away the Court's finding in Virginia Pharmacy, as did the Chief
Justice, that the ban on advertising of a pharmaceutical product is
unconstitutional.66 The distinction between pharmaceutical products
and legal services is significant to Mr. Justice Powell for two reasons:
first, there is a greater risk of deception in the selling of a service; and,
second, there is a much greater difficulty in monitoring and regulating
the sale of a service which is required by the public interest. 7
The proposition that there is no constitutional right to advertise a
legal service was picked up by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in his separate
dissent, in which he described the free-speech provision of the first
amendment as "a sanctuary for expressions of public importance or
intellectual interest."68 Not even the advertisement of goods should be
included in its protection, let alone that of services, according to Mr.
Justice Rehnquist, for to invoke the first amendment on those grounds
is to demean its very importance.69 He considered the majority opinion
in the instant case, following Virginia Pharmacy by only a year, as a
further step down a "slippery slope," which he viewed as threatening
dire consequences for the sanctity of the first amendment itself.7°
64. Id. at 2718.
65. Id. at 2715. Mr. Justice Powell wrote: "The Court seriously understates the
difficulties, and overestimates the capabilities of the Bar-or indeed of any agency
public or private-to assure with a reasonable degree of effectiveness that price advertis-
ing can at the same time be both unrestrained and truthful." Id. at 2715 (emphasis
added).
66. Id. at 2712-13.
67. Id. at 2713.
68. Id. at 2719.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2719-20.
155S1
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This is, of course, in direct opposition to the majority view that
Virginia Pharmacy is controlling. Although a distinction can be made
on the grounds that Virginia Pharmacy involved the sale of goods and
the instant case the sale of services, the Court held the distinction to be
superficial, in view of the fact that the services in question were routine
and readily identifiable.7' The Court, taking the stance that routine legal
services can be freely advertised in the market place, apparently per-
ceives that they can be judged and evaluated by the consuming public
as easily as can a tangible product, with the result that inaccurate or
misleading statements will be discovered and dealt with accordingly. 2
In an effort to carry out the subtle mandate of the Court,7 3 the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association has adopted a
recommendation74 to allow radio and print advertising of twenty-five
enumerated facts75 which pertain to an attorney's professional back-
71. Id. at 2703.
72. Id. at 2699. The Court reviewed its opinion in Virginia Pharmacy, where it
had closely examined the question as to whether a state necessarily furthers its goal of
maintaining high professional standards by prohibiting advertising. It found a
potent alternative to this "highly paternalistic" approach: "That alternative is to
assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best means
to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than to close them."
Id., quoting from Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
73. 97 S. Ct. at 2709.
74. The recommendation, proposed by ABA President-Elect S. Shepard Tate's
ABA Task Force on Lawyer Advertising, was adopted at the 1977 Annual Meeting of
the House of Delegates in Chicago. 63 A.B.A. J. 1410 (Oct. 1977).
75. 46 U.S.L.W. 5 (Aug. 23, 1977). Those facts which may be advertised in a
"dignified manner" under DR 2-101 are (Proposal A):
(1) Name, including name of law firm and names of professional asso-
ciates; addresses and telephone numbers;
(2) One or more fields of law in which the lawyer or law firm practices, a
statement that practice is limited to one or more fields of law, or a statement that
the lawyer or law firm specializes in a particular field of law practice, to the extent
authorized under DR 2-105;
(3) Date and place of birth;
(4) Date and place of admission to the bar of state and federal courts;
(5) Schools attended, with dates of graduation, degrees and other scholastic
distinctions;
(6) Public or quasi-public offices;
(7) Military service;
(8) Legal authorships;
(9) Legal teaching position;
10
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ground and current legal practices. The ABA points out that it is impro-
per for an attorney to imply through advertising that "the ingenuity or
prior record of a lawyer rather than the justice of the claim are the
(10) Memberships, offices, and committee assignments, in bar associations;
(11) Membership and offices in legal fraternities and legal societies;
(12) Technical and professional licenses;
(13) Memberships in scientific, technical and professional associations and
societies;
(14) Foreign language ability;
(15) Names and addresses of bank references;
(16) With their written consent, names of clients regularly represented;
(17) Prepaid or group legal services programs in which the lawyer partici-
pates;
(18) Whether credit cards or other credit arrangements are accepted;
(19) Office and telephone answering service hours;
(20) Fee for an initial consultation;
(21) Availability upon request for a written schedule of fees and/or an
estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates subject to DR2-106(C) provided that the state-
ment discloses whether percentages are computed before or after deduction of
costs;
(23) Range of fees for services, provided that the statement discloses that
the specific fee within the range which will be charged will vary depending upon
the particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled without
obligation to an estimate of the fee within the range likely to be charged, in print
size equivalent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(24) Hourly rate, provided that the statement discloses that the total fee
charged will depend upon the number of hours which must be devoted to the
particular matter to be handled for each client and the client is entitled to without
obligation an estimate of the fee likely to be charged, in print size at least equiva-
lent to the largest print used in setting forth the fee information;
(25) Fixed fees for specific legal services,' the description of which would
not be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that
the quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate
of the fee likely to be charged in print size at least equivalent to the largest print
used in setting forth the fee information:
1. The agency having jurisdiction under state law may desire to issue
appropriate guidelines defining "specific legal services."
Id.
John H. Shenefield, assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division in the
Department of Justice, however, has called these recommendations "narrow changes"
which "fail to meet the needs of the public and the dictates of the Supreme Court." He
has described the Bar's response to Bates as one of "fatuous debate, endless word games,
and glacial change." 63 A.B.A. J. 1703 (Dec. 1977).
157 1
11
et al.: Constitutional Law: First Amendment Guarantees Lawyers Limited Ri
Published by NSUWorks, 1978
158 Nova Law Journal 2:1978
principal factors likely to determine the result. 76 Nor may the attorney
advertise as a specialist in fields other than admiralty, trademark, and
patent law where, the ABA contends, "holding out as a specialist histor-
ically has been permitted. 77
Although permitting radio broadcasts after a thorough screening
by the attorney, the ABA does not intend to make any change in its
Code of Professional Responsibility's ban against television advertis-
ing.78 Of course the Bar is under no obligation to make any such change,
as the Court's ruling considered only newspaper advertising. This is
further evidence that the ABA will revise its Code only to the extent
absolutely necessary to comply with the Court's ruling.
Despite these attempts to establish guidelines, it remains to be seen
whether the Court is correct in its assumption that so-called routine
legal services can be advertised at a particular price without misleading
the public and without further eroding public confidence in the legal
profession. If the minority is correct, and there is no effective way to
regulate the advertisement of legal fee requirements, due to the myriad
of unforeseeable factors involved in every legal transaction, then a dam-
aging blow will have been dealt to the profession at a time when it has
already suffered a marked decline in public approbation. On the other
hand, if the practitioners in the profession accept their new-found liberty
responsibly, it is entirely possible that the legal community will be
greatly benefited. This will result not only in increased public esteem for
lawyers, but-more important-in greater opportunities to provide
better and more diversified legal services to the American public.
Gary E. Guy
76. 46 U.S.L.W. 4 (Aug. 23, 1977).
77. Id. at 5. See also DR 2-105, 46 U.S.L.W. at 7.
78. 46 U.S.L.W. 2 (Aug. 23, 1977). The stated reason for this ABA policy is that
"[tihe problems of advertising on television require special consideration, due to the
style, cost, and transitory nature of such media." Id. at 3. However, the new code
provisions go on to state that "[i l f the interests of laypersons in receiving relevant lawyer
advertising are not adequately secured by print media and radio advertising, and if
adequate safeguards to protect the public can reasonably be formulated, television
advertising may serve a public interest." Id.
12
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